Rankings Software, cloud & internet Prosus
Prosus
83
15070100
A view of the same findings, not a new score. How it works
In the 70+ zone: a score above 70 with more than 20% upside to the median analyst target.
Biggest deductions
- Margin and returns (own operations)−6
- Competition (iFood)−4
- Quality of growth−3
Strengths
- Own operations profitable+2
How the score is built
From 100 to 83, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.
Start
Score
Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.
Key numbers
As of 3 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.
- Price
- 34.80 EUR
- Median analyst target
- 60.45 EUR
- Upside to median
- +73.7%
- Analysts
- 18
- Target range
- 37.00 – 80.00 EUR
- 52-week change
- −42%
- P/E (trailing)
- 7.7
- Forward P/E
- 9.5
- PEG
- 0.24
Findings
Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.
Business
Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 3 findings−12 of −30
- −6Margin and returns (own operations)An operating margin of only 3.3% (FY26) and an EBITDA margin of 6.5% on its own businesses; ROIC 0.6%. Operating profit was negative as recently as FY22–FY24 (−USD 749m, −306m and −167m). Without Tencent the return on invested capital is very low.
- −3Quality of growthRevenue rose 57% to USD 9.7bn in FY26, but a large part was bought via Just Eat Takeaway (EUR 4.1bn), whose own revenue is falling about 6% y/y.
- −3Capital allocationProsus has invested about USD 14bn in food delivery since FY17 with an average IRR of only about 6%, and is now continuing with Just Eat Takeaway; analysts do not understand how the acquisition creates value.
Price
Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 2 findings−4 of −35
- −2Operating cash flowP/FCF 58 and FCF yield 1.7% (FCF about USD 1.3–1.5bn vs market cap EUR 76bn); EV/Sales 9.3 on a business with 3% operating margin.
- −2Discount to net asset valueThe discount to NAV is 35–40% (Goldman Sachs: about 30% with a more cautious valuation of iFood and Just Eat) – around the level where it has stayed persistently since the buyback programme started in 2022, so it is not unusually deep. P/B 1.63 vs 1.52–2.23 in FY22–FY26.
Cracks
Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 4 findings−10 of −35
- −4Competition (iFood)iFood's EBITDA is expected to fall from about EUR 400m to 100–150m over the coming year because Didi (99Food) and Meituan (Keeta) have entered Brazil with aggressive pricing.
- −3Concentration (Tencent)Tencent makes up about 81% of NAV; NAV per share fell to about EUR 80 this summer when Tencent fell on negative sentiment about AI stocks, and the share is down about 44% from its peak in November 2025.
- −2Governance (cross-holding)Naspers controls about 73% of the votes in Prosus through a cross-holding, which is one of the most complicated capital structures in Europe; minority shareholders have limited influence.
- −1DebtDebt USD 17.7bn vs cash and investments of USD 15.7bn (FY26), and interest cover from its own operations is only about 0.5 times; the debt is effectively carried by the Tencent stake.
Plus
Only documented strengths. · 1 finding+2 of +15
- +2Own operations profitableThe e-commerce portfolio has become profitable: adjusted EBITDA of about USD 1.3bn in FY26 and FCF of about USD 1.5bn, an improvement of about USD 2bn over three years (FCF was −USD 817m in FY22).
Caveats
What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
A holding company: about 81% of net asset value is the 23%-owned Tencent stake, so the P/E (7.95), PEG (0.26) and net profit (USD 11.6bn) are driven by the Tencent share and gains, not its own operations – formula points for PEG are therefore misleading. Accounts in USD (year to 31/3), share price in EUR. Stockanalysis shows −39% in share count in a year, which cannot be explained by the buyback (USD 7.4bn) and is probably due to the cross-holding with Naspers – no points have been given for it. The buyback (USD 7.4bn in FY26) is funded by selling Tencent shares and far exceeds FCF (USD 1.5bn), so it earns no plus, even though it raises NAV per share. The average target of EUR 61 (+70%) has not followed the price fall (−39% over 52 weeks, −44% from the peak of EUR 63.94), and targets are not a finding. Tencent's own affairs have not been assessed separately (avoiding double counting). Its own operating earnings are adjusted EBITDA of ~USD 1.3bn; reported operating margin 3.3%. Insider trading and credit rating have not been examined.
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