Rankings Software, cloud & internet Universal Music Group

Universal Music Group

Software, cloud & internet · NetherlandsRank 72 of 829Prices 3 Nov 2026Model 1.4

A strong score: the model found few serious problems, but analysts see limited upside from here.

Biggest deductions

  • Margin−4
  • Debt and debt-funded payouts−4
  • Quality of growth−3

Strengths

  • Pricing power+2
  • Hidden assets+1

How the score is built

From 100 to 85, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.

100Start
85Score

Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.

Key numbers

As of 3 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.

Price
16.89 EUR
Median analyst target
20.00 EUR
Upside to median
+18.4%
Analysts
21
Target range
12.00 – 39.00 EUR
52-week change
−27%
P/E (trailing)
95.8
Forward P/E
15.8
PEG
1.19

Findings

Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.

Business

Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 3 findings
−9 of −30
  • Margin
    Adjusted EBITDA margin fell 1.3 pp to 21.5% in Q2 (excl. Downtown) because of an unfavourable mix, higher legal costs and losses in merchandise (−10.7%). The gross margin has fallen from 45.8% (2021) to 41.7% TTM.
    −4
  • Quality of growth
    Organic growth 6.4% in Q2, but subscription growth fell to 6.7% from 7.9% in Q1, and market share loss cost 1.5 pp – growth is driven by price increases (Streaming 2.0) and the Downtown acquisition (13.3% reported).
    −3
  • ROIC and capital allocation
    ROIC fell from 21.5–31.5% (2021–25) to 16.2% TTM. Downtown (EUR 806m in investment outlays) contributed EUR 288m in revenue, but only EUR 13m adjusted EBITDA in H1 (about 4.5% margin).
    −2

Price

Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 1 finding
−2 of −35
  • Multiples vs own history and peers
    Forward P/E 14.0 vs 23.7–33.0 in 2021–25; EV/EBITDA 13.6 vs 19.6–32.7; P/FCF 16.9 vs 24–40. The lowest level since the IPO, but EPS is expected to fall 3% in 2026, and FCF under the new definition is weak (FCF yield about 5.4% on the 2026 estimate).
    −2

Cracks

Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 3 findings
−7 of −35
  • Debt and debt-funded payouts
    Financial net debt rose from EUR 2.39bn to 4.13bn in six months (Downtown, buybacks of 734m, dividends of 514m), while H1 FCF was only EUR 24m (−85%). Current ratio 0.61, quick ratio 0.41 and Altman Z 0.24; buybacks are partly funded by selling Spotify shares.
    −4
  • AI and legal costs
    Generative AI music is a structural threat to catalogue values; UMG is betting on licensed AI deals (the Spotify collaboration), but needs a 'critical mass' of artists, and legal costs have risen and squeeze the margin.
    −2
  • Governance
    Insiders/major shareholders (the Bolloré sphere) own about 19%, and the free float is 1.26bn of 1.81bn shares; analysts deeply disagree (targets from EUR 12.10 to 39), and the share has fallen 41% in a year.
    −1

Plus

Only documented strengths. · 2 findings
+3 of +15
  • Pricing power
    Streaming 2.0 deals with Spotify, YouTube, Amazon and now Pandora gave a 3.5pp price contribution to subscription growth, and physical sales rose 16% in Q2; in India 72 hours of exclusivity is introduced for paying subscribers.
    +2
  • Hidden assets
    Only about a third of the planned Spotify stake has been sold (EUR 403m gross), so about two thirds remain and can be realised to reduce debt.
    +1

Caveats

What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
Reported net profit fell 84.5% to EUR 222m in H1 due to fair value adjustments of listed equity holdings (incl. Spotify); adjusted net profit was 863m (−2.2%), so trailing P/E of 83 is misleading – T2 is based on forward/adjusted figures. stockanalysis shows no buybacks and +0.14% in share count, but the company bought own shares for EUR 734m in H1 – share count data are not used. UMG has changed its FCF definition (H1 FCF 24m vs 163m), while stockanalysis shows 1.57bn TTM (old method). Downtown consolidated from 20/2/2026. Price targets were cut after the 25% share price fall on 31/7 (e.g. Morgan Stanley 31→25, Goldman 19→15, HSBC 'reduce' 12.10), but several have not been updated – price targets are only included via the formulas. No industry on the list fits music/media; closest chosen (Software, cloud & internet, as earnings are mainly digital streaming). Pershing Square/US listing, EU terms for Downtown and lawsuits are not examined.

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