Rankings Construction & materials Episurf
Episurf
A view of the same findings, not a new score. How it works
The model found several serious problems. That does not mean the stock will fall.
Biggest deductions
- Capital allocation−10
- Governance and conflicts of interest−8
- Debt and financing−8
Strengths
- Bank financing+1
Speculative profile
A penny stock under DKK 3. The asymmetry rating is separate from the Bjarvik score and is not a recommendation.
- Asymmetry (1–10)
- 2
- Price
- 0.05 DKK
- Market value
- DKK 535m
- Cash runway
- 58 months
- Cash / debt
- 362.8 / 625.5m SEK
- Dilution, 12 months
- +340%
Bull case
The portfolio reaches 5.9–10bn SEK with 496m in rental income and 372m in pro forma net operating income. If the financing can be refinanced more cheaply and the stock trades up to 0.9–1.0x NAV, the price could rise 30–50%; more than 2x requires NAV per share to grow despite the share issues.
Bear case
Leverage and expensive loans in a selective credit market, more in-kind issues below NAV and conflicts of interest (SBB-like structure) press NAV per share. With a fall in property values of 10% and 42% loan-to-value, equity falls about 17%, and the stock could trade at 0.4–0.5x NAV.
Catalysts
- H2 2026 (no date)Sale of Episealer patents and intellectual property rights after the wind-down of medtechgradual mb.cision.com
- 2026-11-01 (planned)Acquisition of five property companies (approx. SEK 505m, binding agreement by 30/9)gradual mb.cision.com
- 13 Nov 2026Q3 report: first quarter with KlaraBo, Livi, Lilium and Setune; NAV per share after dilutiongradual stockanalysis.com
How the score is built
From 100 to 38, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.
Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.
Key numbers
As of 3 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.
- Price
- 0.06 SEK
- Median analyst target
- –
- Upside to median
- –
- Analysts
- none
- Target range
- –
- 52-week change
- +65%
- P/E (trailing)
- n/a
- Forward P/E
- n/a
- PEG
- n/a
Findings
Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.
Business
Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 4 findings−27 of −30
- −7Margin and returnsThe properties give an operating result of SEK 13.1m in H1 2026 (profit margin 72%), but the period's result was −SEK 234m after a goodwill write-down of 162.4m and a revaluation of −20.1m, and operating cash flow before working capital was −44.4m.
- −6Quality of growthRental income rose 413% in Q2 to SEK 12.3m, but the growth is purely bought: property investments of 969m in H1 and agreements on a further SEK 3.8bn, paid with new shares at SEK 0.045-0.10, convertibles and loans. There is no organic history.
- −10Capital allocationThe share count has risen 340% over a year to 10.7bn, and the Frusipe deal alone could give 354–1,208% dilution. Shortly after the purchases, SEK 162m in goodwill was written down, i.e. more than net asset value was paid, and the medtech part is being wound down after many years of losses without sales.
- −4Structure and moatA quickly acquired, mixed portfolio (LSS housing, residential, logistics, commercial) in smaller Swedish towns and Finland, managed by Newsec. The CEO himself writes that in the build-up phase the company gets worse loan terms than established property companies.
Price
Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 2 findings−5 of −35
- −2Multiples vs own historyThe history is not comparable after the conversion. P/B is 1.32 versus 1.06–1.30 in 2024–2025 (at the top), and EV/Sales of 40 is meaningless because most properties were only taken over after 30/6.
- −3Peers and substanceThe price of SEK 0.074 is about 0.74x NAV per share (SEK 0.10 at 30/6). Smaller Swedish property companies with higher debt typically trade at 0.5-0.8x NAV, so the discount is normal and not a mispricing, especially as NAV rests on contribution-in-kind values.
Cracks
Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 4 findings−25 of −35
- −8Governance and conflicts of interestIlija Batljan (SBB's founder) owns over 22% of Episurf via IB Invest and Health Runner and at the same time held a convertible in the seller Frusipe that could give 48%. He is described as being on all sides of the deal, and the structure is criticised for circumventing bond terms.
- −8Debt and financingInterest-bearing debt was SEK 625.5m as of 30/6 (from 4.9m at the turn of the year) and grows with acquisitions to a pro forma portfolio of SEK 5.9bn. The loan-to-value ratio is 42%, but financing consists of bank loans, convertibles (incl. 66.5m at STIBOR + 1.75%) and reverses, and new acquisitions require ongoing new financing.
- −6Continued dilutionEach deal is partly paid with new B shares: 2.89bn shares at SEK 0.045 to KlaraBo (July), 869m at SEK 0.10 to Grännäs (July), 834m on conversion (June), plus new convertibles and warrants to Frusipe. The company itself writes that dilution from earlier agreements continues.
- −3ExecutionAgreements worth SEK 3.8bn are to be taken over in the autumn, and the vision is SEK 10bn in property value in 2026. A portfolio in the Frusipe deal had not even been taken over by the seller, and a property worth 233m is legally taken over only within 18 months.
Plus
Only documented strengths. · 1 finding+1 of +15
- +1Bank financingThe two largest acquisitions are financed by a Nordic bank, and the portfolio has a forward direct yield of 6.6% and a pro forma occupancy rate of about 94%.
Caveats
What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
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