Rankings Software, cloud & internet Spotify Technology

Spotify Technology

Software, cloud & internet · United StatesRank 208 of 829Prices 2 Nov 2026Model 1.4

A strong score: the model found few serious problems, but analysts see limited upside from here.

Biggest deductions

  • Multiples vs own history and peers−8
  • Margin and moat−3
  • Quality of growth−3

Strengths

  • Net cash+2
  • Pricing power+2

How the score is built

From 100 to 75, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.

100Start
75Score

Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.

Key numbers

As of 2 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.

Price
594.04 USD
Median analyst target
652.58 USD
Upside to median
+9.9%
Analysts
41
Target range
458.87 – 749.42 USD
52-week change
−9%
P/E (trailing)
37.0
Forward P/E
37.0
PEG
1.41

Findings

Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.

Business

Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 3 findings
−7 of −30
  • Margin and moat
    Gross margin has risen from 26.0% (2023) to 33.4% in Q2 2026 and operating margin from −1.5% to 13.7%, so the company is getting stronger. But about two-thirds of revenue still goes to rights holders, and the major record labels are pushing on the terms. Operating margin is less than half of Netflix's.
    −3
  • Quality of growth
    Revenue grew 14% (15% at constant exchange rates) in Q2 2026, driven by Premium (+16% CER) with ARPU +7% from price increases and subscribers +9%. The advertising segment is standing still: +1% in Q2 after falling for two quarters in a row, and ad prices are falling.
    −3
  • Capital allocation
    Buybacks of EUR 1.18bn TTM have only kept the share count steady (+0.07% y/y), because share-based pay (EUR 274m) and issuance (EUR 204m) eat into it. The buyback neutralises dilution instead of reducing the share count.
    −1

Price

Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 1 finding
−8 of −35
  • Multiples vs own history and peers
    Forward P/E 35.1 vs 44.5 (2025) and 52.6 (2024); P/FCF 29.9 vs 35.5-38.2; EV/EBIT 33.7. Cheaper than its own short history as a profitable company, but still expensive vs media and streaming peers with higher margins, and FCF yield is only 3.4%. The price assumes continued EPS growth of about 25%.
    −8

Cracks

Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 4 findings
−9 of −35
  • Guidance and execution
    Two disappointing guidances in a row: Q2 guidance for operating profit and subscribers made the share fall about 14% in April (largest fall in over four years), and Q3 guidance (operating profit EUR 670m, 788m MAU) was below consensus (about EUR 678m and 793m). MAU came in 1m below own guidance in Q2.
    −3
  • Customer behaviour and competition
    Third price increase in 30 months (USA USD 11.99 to 12.99 from February 2026), while Apple Music and Amazon Music have held prices. Analysts point to the risk of price fatigue and churn, and MAU growth is slowing (Q3 +11m vs expected about +16m).
    −2
  • Governance
    Founders Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon have voting control via beneficiary certificates (about 16% of shares, a much larger share of votes). Ek became executive chairman on 1/1/2026 and still decides capital allocation, while two co-CEOs run the company. Split top management is a new execution risk.
    −2
  • Insider selling
    Daniel Ek has sold shares for over $800m since 2023 in fixed blocks every other week, and Lorentzon sold $557m in 2024. No insider purchases.
    −2

Plus

Only documented strengths. · 2 findings
+4 of +15
  • Net cash
    Net cash of EUR 6.5bn (about 7% of market value) after redemption of the convertible bonds in Q1 2026; debt/EBITDA 0.17.
    +2
  • Pricing power
    Premium ARPU rose 7% (7.4% CER) in Q2 2026 on price increases, while subscribers grew 9% to 300m. The Premium gross margin rose from 33% to 35% because revenue grew faster than royalty costs.
    +2

Caveats

What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
The Q3 results come 22/10/2026 and are not included. Trailing P/E (29) is flattered by financial income and a low tax rate (4.7% TTM), so forward P/E 35 is the right measure. Insider sales in 2026 are not examined, because Spotify as a foreign issuer does not file Form 4; the finding is based on Ek's sales in 2023-25. Competition from AI-generated music is not quantified.

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