Rankings Software, cloud & internet CoreWeave

CoreWeave

Software, cloud & internet · United StatesRank 691 of 829Prices 2 Nov 2026Model 1.4

The model found several serious problems. That does not mean the stock will fall.

Biggest deductions

  • Debt and financing needs−10
  • Peers and EBITDA quality−7
  • Margin and ROIC−6

Strengths

  • Contracted order book+4
  • Pricing power+2

How the score is built

From 100 to 40, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.

100Start
40Score

Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.

Key numbers

As of 2 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.

Price
50.15 USD
Median analyst target
135.00 USD
Upside to median
+169.2%
Analysts
42
Target range
39.00 – 278.00 USD
52-week change
−62%
P/E (trailing)
n/a
Forward P/E
n/a
PEG
n/a

Findings

Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.

Business

Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 4 findings
−19 of −30
  • Margin and ROIC
    Operating margin −2.7% and net margin −25% TTM; ROIC −0.3%. Gross margin has fallen from 74–76% in 2024–25 to 66% in Q2 2026, and adjusted operating margin was only 5% in Q2 (USD 128m vs 200m a year earlier). Depreciation (4.0bn TTM) and interest eat all of EBITDA. The loss is counted only here.
    −6
  • Capital allocation and dilution
    Capex guidance for 2026 is USD 35–39bn against revenue of 12.4–13.2bn (about 3 times revenue). The share count rose about 13% in a year, share-based pay USD 619m (8% of revenue), USD 3.0bn in new shares TTM (incl. Nvidia and Jane Street), and in September came an ATM programme of up to 35m shares on top of convertible loans with a conversion price of USD 97.85.
    −6
  • Moat
    The core service is rental of Nvidia GPUs, which the hyperscalers, Nebius, IREN and Oracle also offer. The software layer is growing (managed inference ARR >100m, non-GPU products >400m ARR), but is under 5% of run-rate revenue; no real lock-in beyond the contract terms.
    −3
  • Quality of growth
    Revenue is growing 112%, but the growth is debt-financed and does not turn into earnings: Q3 guidance implies interest expenses of USD 860–940m vs adjusted operating profit of only 200–260m, and consensus expects EPS of −3.94 in 2026 vs −2.81 in 2025 (the loss grows with revenue).
    −4

Price

Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 2 findings
−13 of −35
  • Multiples vs own history
    EV/Sales 12.6 vs 10.2 at the end of 2025 and EV/EBITDA 25.3 vs 21.6; P/B 10.1 on equity of only USD 5.0bn. Only one year of history, but the multiples have risen even though the stock is -34% in a year, because debt has grown faster than revenue.
    −6
  • Peers and EBITDA quality
    EV/EBITDA 25 vs Oracle 15.5 and EV/Sales 12.6 vs Oracle 7.4 (Nebius 48 and IREN 26 are more expensive). Forward P/S 2.5 looks cheap, but half of the EV of 94.8bn is net debt (46bn), and EBITDA is misleading when GPUs are depreciated over six years and interest is 3.6bn annually; negative EPS and FCF -28.9bn are expected in 2026.
    −7

Cracks

Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 6 findings
−28 of −35
  • Debt and financing needs
    Total debt USD 51.6bn incl. leasing, net debt 46bn, debt/EBITDA 9.2, interest coverage −0.1, Altman Z 0.29, current ratio 0.46 and negative working capital of 11.4bn. The most expensive layer is 9.75% bonds due 2031 (2.75bn). Interest paid rose to 1.3bn TTM, Q3 interest guided at approx. 0.9bn for the quarter, and management itself says more debt and/or equity will be necessary.
    −10
  • Customer concentration
    Microsoft accounted for approx. 67% of revenue in 2025; the largest customer was still 45% in Q1 and 36% in Q2 2026. The order book of USD 104bn sits with few buyers: OpenAI with up to 22.4bn in commitments (itself dependent on external financing), Meta and Anthropic. The value of the contracts depends on these customers' ability to pay.
    −6
  • GPU depreciation and residual value
    GPUs and network equipment are depreciated over six years (extended from five in 2023), which lowers depreciation by several hundred USD million a year. Critics put the useful life at 3–5 years under full load; with new Nvidia generations every year there is a risk of write-downs and lower prices on re-leasing.
    −4
  • Insider selling and voting control
    The founders Intrator, McBee and Venturo have sold over USD 2.3bn since the IPO, and Magnetar over 5.5bn (stake halved); Intrator sold again in April, July and August 2026. A/B structure in which the founders' B shares give voting control, so minority shareholders have little influence. No insider purchases found.
    −4
  • Circular Nvidia relationship
    Nvidia is at once supplier of nearly all hardware, shareholder (bought for USD 2bn at USD 87.20/share in January 2026) and customer/backstop (USD 6.3bn agreement to buy unused capacity). That artificially supports demand and makes CoreWeave dependent on one supplier's allocation and pricing.
    −2
  • Market signal
    Short interest 16.7% of free float, the stock −34% over 52 weeks and below both the 50- and 200-day averages.
    −2

Plus

Only documented strengths. · 2 findings
+6 of +15
  • Contracted order book
    Order book of USD 104bn as of 30/6 (+246%) plus over 25bn in new commitments at the start of Q3; 4.2 GW of contracted power. Customer prepayments of USD 4.8bn TTM co-finance capex, and 2026 guidance was raised to 12.4–13.2bn.
    +4
  • Pricing power
    Raised prices by about 25% across GPU types in July, and the Q2 contracts have 5–10 percentage points higher expected contribution margin than the previous quarters.
    +2

Caveats

What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
Industry set to the closest: Software, cloud & internet (AI cloud/GPU rental, in reality capital-intensive infrastructure). Listed only since March 2025, so own multiple history is one fiscal year. Stockanalysis' share growth of +76% is distorted by the IPO conversion; the real increase is c. 13% (487 → 552m shares). Total debt of USD 51.6bn includes lease liabilities; the company itself reported c. USD 35bn in loans at 30/6 before new convertible loans of 4.2bn in September. The Core Scientific acquisition was rejected by Core Scientific's shareholders in October 2025 and has not been resumed. Not flagged cyclical: revenue rests on multi-year take-or-pay contracts, but GPU prices and residual values are a real risk. Price USD 91.72, market cap 48.7bn, EV USD 94.8bn (7 Oct 2026).

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