Rankings Oil & gas Questerre Energy

Questerre Energy

Oil & gas · CanadaRank 615 of 829Prices 30 Oct 2026Model 1.4Penny

The model found several serious problems. That does not mean the stock will fall.

Biggest deductions

  • Margin and earnings−8
  • Debt and liquidity−7
  • Quality of growth−6

Strengths

  • Asset sales and cash flow+1
  • Technology test+1

Speculative profile

A penny stock under DKK 3. The asymmetry rating is separate from the Bjarvik score and is not a recommendation.

All penny stocks
Asymmetry (1–10)
4
Price
1.40 DKK
Market value
DKK 611m
Cash runway
– months
Cash / debt
44.2 / 113.3m CAD
Dilution, 12 months
+3%

Bull case

The retort in Brazil is running efficiently again, sales are reaching production (about 4,150 boe/d), and HCCO saves part of the roughly 15% of production that today goes to own consumption. With Canada (1,500 boe/d), EBITDA can reach C$70–90m. At EV/EBITDA of 4 and after the Brazil debt, that corresponds to equity of C$200–300m (1.5–2.2x). A 3–5x increase also requires a settlement or compensation in Quebec, but that value is now shared with the QGAS preference shares.

Bear case

Low oil price, customers who still fail to lift, and retort problems mean PX cannot refinance US$80m (plus PIK interest) in April 2028. Then the bondholders may take over PX, and Questerre is left with 1,500 boe/d in Canada, a blocked Quebec asset and a working capital deficit: -50-70%.

Catalysts

  1. 12 Nov 2026Q3 2026 results: shows whether sales in Brazil have reached the contract minimum, and whether the inventory of 40,000 barrels has been soldgradual stockanalysis.com
  2. Jan 2027Hearing on objections in the constitutional case against Quebec's revocation of the licences (the attorney general's reply was set for September 2026)gradual in.investing.com
  3. By 2027-09-30 at the latestMilestone for PX Energy: FCF of US$30m, which triggers contingent consideration shares and shows whether the acquisition holds upgradual questerre.com
Risk of going to zeromedium – positive funds flow and ring-fenced debt protect the parent company, but operations in Brazil are unstable, the interest is PIK'd, and there is a working capital deficit of C$19m.
Next financingNo acute equity issue: adjusted funds flow was C$18.3m in Q2 2026, and the Kakwa sale yielded C$23.5m. Brazil pays interest as PIK in 2026, and the secured bonds of US$80m (ring-fenced) mature in April 2028. Refinancing must be in place during 2027. If it fails, the bondholders can take over PX, but the parent company is not liable.
Warrants & convertiblesWarrants on 40m shares to the Nimofast management (exercisable if the share price is CAD 0.50 for 20 days in a row within 18 months from September 2025; strike not found). 50m contingent consideration shares to the PX sellers in two tranches (incl. FCF of USD 30m by 30/9-2027 at the latest). Pending share issuance of CAD 5.8m to PX sellers and Red Leaf. USD 8m in convertible notes in F&M Resources (conversion price not found) and share options. QGAS preference shares: 45.2m after 10:1 consolidation.
Insiders, last 12 monthsnone found (not systematically examined); 15m consideration shares to the PX sellers are subject to lock-up
Largest ownersInsiders approx. 5.1% (incl. CEO Michael Binnion), institutions approx. 2.0% according to stockanalysis; the PX sellers hold 15m shares (approx. 3.3%). The rest is spread among private investors, many in Norway.
Circio check(1) Small market cap: partial – DKK 611m is not micro. (2) Hot theme: no – shale oil and blocked gas. (3) Upcoming data/milestones: partial – Q3 results, HCCO installation and Quebec hearings, but no binary game changer in the short term. (4) Major partner: partial – Nimofast (fuel distributor with approx. USD 2bn in revenue) is the JV partner. (5) Funding for 2+ years: partial – no equity issue needed now, but bond maturity in April 2028. (6) Price near the bottom: partial – −24% in a year and close to the 52-week low.
Why this asymmetryThe company earns money at the operating level, and the price reflects scepticism towards Brazil, so an operational turnaround can give 1.5–2x. But 3–10x requires Quebec, which is slow and partly carved out into QGAS, and the debt in Brazil plus the unstable retort give a real downside.

How the score is built

From 100 to 45, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.

100Start
45Score

Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.

Key numbers

As of 30 Oct 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.

Price
0.29 CAD
Median analyst target
–
Upside to median
–
Analysts
none
Target range
–
52-week change
−9%
P/E (trailing)
n/a
Forward P/E
n/a
PEG
n/a

Findings

Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.

Business

Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 4 findings
−22 of −30
  • Margin and earnings
    TTM operating margin −11.7% and net margin −49% (ROIC −11%). The EBITDA margin is only 26% despite revenue of CAD 140m, and FCF is just CAD 4.8m (3.4% margin). Operations went from profit in 2022 to loss every year 2023–25.
    −8
  • Quality of growth
    Revenue growth (+273% TTM) was bought via PX Energy (Brazilian oil sands and shale retort from Petrobras' Petrosix technology), while Kakwa production (650 boe/d) was sold. In Q2 2026 production in Brazil was approx. 4,150 boe/d, but sales only 3,100 boe/d. Customers lifted below the contract minimum, inventory grew to 40,000 barrels, and the retort ran inefficiently after a maintenance stop.
    −6
  • Future segment and moat
    Shale oil from retort is a high-cost, CO2-heavy niche that depends on oil price and biomass energy. The largest resource, the Utica gas in Quebec, is blocked by the province's ban on hydrocarbon extraction. No clear moat beyond the recently tested HCCO concept.
    −4
  • Capital allocation
    The PX acquisition was paid with 65m shares (of which 50m contingent on milestones), Nimofast management received warrants on 40m shares, and PX is owned only 50% even though it carries 80m US$ in bonds. Market cap is largely unchanged since 2021 (99 → 134m C$) despite large investments.
    −4

Price

Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 2 findings
−8 of −35
  • Multiples vs own history and peers
    EV/EBITDA 5.1 TTM vs 2.6-6.9 in 2021-24 (17.6 in 2025). P/B 1.47 and P/TBV 3.85 vs 0.5-0.7 in 2021-24. Small oil and gas companies typically trade at 2-4x EBITDA, so the stock is not cheap, even though the price has fallen.
    −5
  • FCF pricing
    P/FCF 27.9 and EV/FCF 39.2, because only a little of EBITDA turns into free cash flow after capex, working capital and interest accrual. The FCF yield is only 3.6%.
    −3

Cracks

Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 5 findings
−21 of −35
  • Debt and liquidity
    Secured bonds of USD 80m (carried at CAD 116.7m) maturing in April 2028 are ring-fenced in Brazil, but interest for all of 2026 is paid as PIK and added to principal. The working capital deficit was CAD 19.1m at 30/6-2026 and CAD 51.5m in Brazil, and the current ratio is 0.82.
    −7
  • Customers and operations in Brazil
    Customers lifted below the contract minimum, so an inventory of 40,000 barrels built up, and the retort's efficiency and higher feed costs pressure the margin. Sales depend on a few buyers in one country.
    −4
  • Regulation in Quebec
    Quebec revoked the licences; the constitutional case is slow, with a reply from the attorney general in September 2026 and a hearing on objections in January 2027. The CEO does not expect an actual hearing date until late 2027 or 2028.
    −4
  • Potential dilution
    50m contingent consideration shares to the PX sellers (milestone: FCF of US$30m by 30/9-2027), warrants on 40m shares to Nimofast and shares worth C$5.8m to PX sellers and Red Leaf together equal about 20% of the 452.8m shares.
    −4
  • Partner and jurisdiction risk
    PX Energy is run 50/50 with Nimofast (equal number of board seats), and the bonds sit in Forbes Resources Brazil without a parent guarantee, so Questerre does not control its largest activity alone.
    −2

Plus

Only documented strengths. · 2 findings
+2 of +15
  • Asset sales and cash flow
    Kakwa Central was sold for C$23.5m in cash (gain C$17.5m), and the working capital deficit fell from C$49.6m to 19.1m. Adjusted funds flow was C$39.1m in H1 2026.
    +1
  • Technology test
    An HCCO test at commercial scale succeeded for under C$100,000, and it can reduce internal fuel consumption (about 15% of production). The installation is planned within 12 months.
    +1

Caveats

What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
Penny analysis (Under DKK 3 – Nordics). The Nordnet line is Euronext Oslo (QEC, NOK 2.03 = DKK 1.40), but stockanalysis only has the TSX page (osl/QEC gives 404), so path, currency and penny amounts are in C$ (TSX price C$0.295 at 30/9-2026). Check: 452.8m shares × DKK 1.40 ≈ DKK 634m vs Nordnet's DKK 611m, i.e. within 4%. The company consolidates PX Energy 100%, but owns it only 50/50 with Nimofast, so revenue and debt are gross. The 2025 figures are affected by impairments of C$49.8m and the TTM figures by a gain of C$17.5m from the Kakwa sale. The QGAS preferred shares (the Quebec value) have traded separately since 30/6-2026, so part of the Quebec option no longer sits in the common stock. No analyst coverage, and insider trades have not been investigated.

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