Rankings Commodities & uranium Lucara Diamond
Lucara Diamond
45
15070100
A view of the same findings, not a new score. How it works
The model found several serious problems. That does not mean the stock will fall.
Biggest deductions
- Debt−9
- Capital allocation−7
- FCF yield−7
Strengths
- Strategic owner+2
- Unique deposit+2
- Cost control+1
Speculative profile
A penny stock under DKK 3. The asymmetry rating is separate from the Bjarvik score and is not a recommendation.
- Asymmetry (1–10)
- 4
- Price
- 0.78 DKK
- Market value
- DKK 1,189m
- Cash runway
- 15 months
- Cash / debt
- 2,314.0 / 3,325.0m CAD
- Dilution, 12 months
- +94%
Bull case
The UGP is delivered in H1 2028 with no new overruns, the market for large stones holds, and Karowe returns to USD 200m+ in revenue with about 50% gross margin. With EBITDA of USD 100–120m and net debt of about USD 200m, an EV/EBITDA of 4–5 could give a market cap of USD 250–400m – about 1.5–2.5x today's. A 3x requires a marked recovery in diamond prices or large finds like Sewelô (1,758 ct).
Bear case
The stockpile ore gives lower income in 2027, diamond prices fall further under pressure from lab-grown stones, and the UGP is delayed again. With the 12.5% bond and a funding gap, a new share issue far below CAD 0.16 or a bond restructuring could hit shareholders.
Catalysts
- 6 Nov 2026Q3 2026 report (estimated date): diamond prices, stockpile processing and UGP progressgradual stockanalysis.com
- Q4 2026Open pit mine ending; transition to processing stockpiled oregradual lucaradiamond.com
- H2 2027The first underground development ore replaces stockpiled orebinary lucaradiamond.com
- H1 2028Full underground production at Karowegradual lucaradiamond.com
Risk of going to zerolow to medium – the company has a producing mine, Lundin backing and cash for most of the project, but debt is large and 2027 will be a thin year.
Next financingThe company calls the UGP fully funded after the bond and the share issue in Q1 2026. But remaining capex is USD 275.9m vs cash of USD 243.6m, and interest costs about USD 11m per quarter, while revenue from 2027 comes from stockpile ore. Delays or weak diamond prices in 2027 could trigger a need for a working capital facility or new equity before full production in H1 2028.
Warrants & convertiblesNo convertibles found; the USD 350m bond (12.5%, 5 years) is straight debt. The dilution has already happened: 1.03bn new shares at CAD 0.16 in Q1 2026 (+94% in a year). Options/warrants not examined.
Insiders, last 12 monthsThe Lundin family trusts took part in the issue at CAD 0.16 in Q1 2026 (amount not verified). Other insider trades not examined.
Largest ownersLundin Family Trusts (largest owner, stake not verified); institutions about 5% according to stockanalysis.
Circio check(1) Small market value: partly – about DKK 1.2bn, larger than most penny stocks. (2) Hot theme: no – natural diamonds are unpopular. (3) Upcoming milestones: yes – underground ore in H2 2027 and full production in H1 2028, but they are far off. (4) Large partner: yes – the Lundin family. (5) Funding for 2+ years: partly – the UGP is called fully funded, but the margin is thin. (6) Price near the bottom: yes – the price is close to the CAD 0.16 issue price and far below CAD 0.59 in 2021.
Why this asymmetryMost of the underground project has been paid for, and a large owner is supportive, so the zero risk is lower than for the others. But the dilution has happened, the debt costs 12.5%, and the upside depends on a diamond market facing structural headwinds – more like 1.5–2.5x than 10x.
How the score is built
From 100 to 45, step by step: points off for the business, the price and the cracks, back for documented strengths, then three data adjustments.
Start
Score
Hover or select a step to see what drove it. Steps with findings open them below.
Key numbers
As of 2 Nov 2026. Analyst targets tend to be optimistic; read upside as a hint, not a forecast.
- Price
- 0.12 CAD
- Median analyst target
- –
- Upside to median
- –
- Analysts
- none
- Target range
- –
- 52-week change
- −31%
- P/E (trailing)
- 5.3
- Forward P/E
- n/a
- PEG
- n/a
Findings
Every deduction and every plus, with its source. Open a step to read them.
Business
Is the company getting stronger, not just bigger? · 5 findings−23 of −30
- −5MarginThe gross margin has fallen from 54% (2021) and 50% (2024) to 34% (TTM), and the operating margin from 33% (2024) to 12%; H1 2026 delivered only USD 1.0m of net profit.
- −5Quality of growthRevenue is falling (−25% TTM; guidance USD 100–130m for 2026 vs 160m in 2025). The open pit mine ends in Q4 2026, and until underground ore arrives in H2 2027, the plant runs on stockpiles of previously mined ore.
- −3ROICROIC has fallen from 15% (2024) to 2.7% (TTM) because about USD 470m is tied up in an underground project that only gives full production in H1 2028.
- −7Capital allocationKarowe Underground: capex has risen from USD 514m (original FS) via 683m to USD 779m, and completion has been pushed from H2 2026 to H1 2028. The bill was paid with a share issue of 1.03bn shares at CAD 0.16 (+94% shares in a year) and a USD 350m bond at 12.5%.
- −3Future segmentNatural diamonds are under structural pressure from lab-grown stones; the company itself describes a 'K-shaped' market in which smaller commercial stones continue to be squeezed on price, while only large stones hold up.
Price
Today's multiples against the company's own history and its peers. · 2 findings−13 of −35
- −6Multiples vs own historyEV/EBITDA 9.6 vs 2.3–6.4 in 2021–2025 and EV/EBIT 18 vs 3–9 – expensive vs history on falling earnings. P/B of 0.41 is low (0.48–0.85 in 2021–2024), and an EV of about USD 330m equals about 0.75x the UGP's NPV8 of USD 432m.
- −7FCF yieldFree cash flow −USD 84m TTM (FCF yield about −48%) and negative every year since 2021 because of the underground project.
Cracks
Cash flow, customers, debt, insiders, guidance and what sits behind the headline numbers. · 3 findings−18 of −35
- −9DebtSenior secured bond of USD 350m at 12.5% (about USD 44m annual interest) vs EBITDA of about USD 32m TTM; net debt/EBITDA 4.7 and interest cover 2.2.
- −5Execution and construction fundingRemaining UGP costs are USD 275.9m vs cash of USD 243.6m; 'fully funded' assumes cash flow from stockpile processing at a weak diamond price. The project has previously overrun budget and schedule several times.
- −4Customer concentrationHB Trading BV accounted for 83% of revenue in Q2 2026 (USD 33.9m), with top-up/top-down adjustments after the final polished prices.
Plus
Only documented strengths. · 3 findings+5 of +15
- +2Strategic ownerThe Lundin family trusts stepped in and carried the large share issue for the underground project – an experienced mine owner with deep pockets behind the company.
- +2Unique depositKarowe has produced ten diamonds above 1,000 carats (most recently a 1,303-carat type IIa), and the UGP extends mine life to 2038 with about 4.5m carats – a rare asset in the segment that is doing best.
- +1Cost controlOperating cost per tonne processed fell 11% to USD 23.76 in Q2 2026 – below guidance of USD 27.50–31.00.
Caveats
What the score does not capture, or where the data is weak.
Penny analysis (Under DKK 3). Primary listing on TSX; the Stockholm line (First North, about SEK 1.17) has no stockanalysis page (404 on quote/sto/LUC), so 'sti' (path) points to quote/tsx/LUC, where the price is in CAD – hence currency CAD in the sheet (the penny object uses SEK). The company reports in USD; penny amounts are converted at about 9.5 SEK/USD. stockanalysis' statistics pages mix CAD (market cap, multiples) and USD (financials). Runway is calculated on remaining UGP capex and interest, not just TTM FCF. The Lundin family's exact ownership stake and insider trades are not verified. No analyst forecast examined.
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